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Abstract—Nowadays, with the booming development of Inter-
net and software industry, more and more malware variants
are designed to perform various malicious activities. Traditional
signature-based detection methods can not detect variants of mal-
ware. In addition, most behavior-based methods require a secure
and isolated environment to perform malware detection, which is
vulnerable to be contaminated. In this paper, similar to natural
language processing, we propose a novel and efficient approach to
perform static malware analysis, which can automatically learn
the opcode sequence patterns of malware. We propose modeling
malware as a language and assess the feasibility of this approach.
First, We use the disassembly tool IDA Pro to obtain opcode
sequence of malware. Then the word embedding technique is used
to learn the feature vector representation of opcode. Finally, we
propose a two-stage LSTM model for malware detection, which
use two LSTM layers and one mean-pooling layer to obtain the
feature representations of opcode sequences of malwares. We
perform experiments on the dataset that includes 969 malware
and 123 benign files. In terms of malware detection and malware
classification, the evaluation results show our proposed method
can achieve average AUC of 0.99 and average AUC of 0.987 in
best case, respectively.
Index Terms—Malware detection and classification, Static
analysis, Opcode language, Long short-term memory
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious software is referred to as malware, which is de-
signed to perform various malicious activities, such as stealing
private information, gaining root authority, disabling targeted
host and so on. Meanwhile, with the booming development
of Internet and software industry, more and more variants of
malware are emerging and almost everywhere. According to a
2018 McAfee threats report [1], the total number of malware
samples has grown almost 34% over the past quarters to more
than 774 million samples. It can be seen that the number of
malware continues to increase. Hence, malware detection is
always a attractive and meaningful issue.
A large number of research have been published on how to
detect malware. Malware detection can be simply considered
as a binary classification problem, and traditional anti-virus
software usually relies on static signature-based detection
method [2], which has a significant limitation. some minor
changes in malware can change the signature, so more mal-
ware could easily evade signature-based detection by encrypt-
ing, obfuscating or packing. Meanwhile, the zero-day malware
can also evade this detection approach. The dynamic analysis
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is not susceptible to code obfuscation techniques [3], so it is a
more effective malware detection method. Dynamic behavior-
based malware detection methods [4] [5] usually need a secure
and controlled environment, such as virtual machine, simula-
tor, sandbox, etc. Then the behavior analysis is performed by
using the interaction information with the environment such
as API calls and DLL calls. Although these techniques have
been widely studied, they have also been confirmed to be less
efficient enough when applied to large dataset [6]. Dynamic
behavior-based malware detection methods are quite time-
consuming and require considerable attention to protect the
operating environment from contaminated.
At present, a number of malware detection methods com-
bined with machine learning techniques have been proposed.
Reference [7] first proposed a malware detection method using
data mining technique, which use three different types of
static features: PE header, string sequence, and byte sequence.
Kolter and Maloof [8] proposed to use n-gram instead of
byte sequence and compared the performance of naive bayes,
decision trees, support vector machines for malware detection.
Later, artificial neural network [9] [10] were also used for
malware detection. Meanwhile, there are also some novel ideas
for malware detection. Both [11] and [12] utilize the technique
of image processing to detect malware. In terms of malware
detection, the previous works have achieved good enough per-
formance. However, most of these methods manually extract
malware features which are used to train a machine learning
classifier.
To reduce the cost of artificial feature engineering, in this
paper, we propose a novel and efficient method to detect
whether a Windows executable file is malware. First, we use
the disassembly tool IDA Pro to obtain the assembly format
file of all executable files. Next, we develop an algorithm to
extract opcode sequence from each assembly format file. Then,
similar to natural language processing (NLP), word embedding
technology [13] is used to learn the feature vector representa-
tion of opcode, and long-short term memory (LSTM) [14] is
used to automatically learn opcode sequence patterns of mal-
ware. To increase invariance of the local feature representation,
we also introduce a mean-pooling layer after second LSTM
layer. To verify the effectiveness of our proposed method, we
make a series of experiments on the dataset that includes 969
malwares and 123 benign files. In the experimental section,
we evaluate the effect of the second LSTM layer on malware
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
04
59
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 J
un
 20
19
detection performance, and we also make detailed performance
comparison with other related work. In terms of malware
detection and malware classification, the evaluation result
shows our proposed method can achieve average AUC of 0.99
and average AUC of 0.987, respectively.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper:
• We present a novel and efficient malware detection ap-
proach, which makes use of word embedding technology
and LSTM to automatically learn the opcode sequence
patterns of malwares. It can greatly reduce the cost of
artificial feature engineering.
• We propose and implement a two-stage LSTM model
for malware detection, which use two LSTM layers
and one mean-pooling layer to automatically obtain the
comprehensive feature representation of malware.
• We make a series of evaluation experiment including
malware detection and malware classification. The ex-
primental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposed method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related
work on neural network is discussed in Section II. Section
III describes the proposed malware detection framework. Ex-
periment and evaluation are presented in Section IV. Section
V concludes the paper and discusses the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Word Embedding
Recurrent Neural Network Based Language Model
(RNNLM) [15] is the language model using recurrent
neural network, which can predict the next word from
previous input. Later, Mikolov [13] proposed the CBOW and
Skip-gram language model in efficient estimation of word
representations in vector space. CBOW model can predict
current word by the given context. In contrast, Skip-gram
model can predict context by the given current word. Then,
each word is converted to feature vector which store the
semantic information of word, and the correlation between
words can also be calculated using this feature vector.
B. Recurrent Neural Network
Neural network (NN) is a kind of mathematical model
which is consisted of many neuron layers. Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) is a typical structure of NN, and it has a
special memory unit which can retain the state information of
previous hidden layer. RNN shows good results in various
fields which use sequential data such as natural language
processing and speech recognition. A large amount of research
works using RNN for malware detection has been published.
EI-Bakry [16] proposed that a time delay neural networks
could be used for malware classification, but the paper did
not carry out any experiments to validate the idea. Pascanu et
al. [17] proposed a malware detection method using RNN.
However, [17] uses API calls as the original feature for
malware detection. Tobiyama et al. [18] proposed a malware
detection method with deep neural network using process
behavior. However, because of the discovery of the vanishing
and exploding gradient problem, RNN became unpopular until
the LSTM was proposed. LSTM [14] is a special type of
RNN, which can greatly mitigate the vanishing and exploding
gradient problem.
III. MALWARE DETECTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the proposed malware detec-
tion approach in detail, which is similar to natural language
processing. As shown in Figure 1, the malware detection
methodology can be simply divided into the data processing
stage and modeling stage. In the data processing stage, we
first use the disassembly tool IDA Pro, which can resolve
executable file into Intel X86 assembly format file. Next, we
develop a algorithm to extract opcode sequence from each
assembly format file. In the modeling stage, word embedding
technology is used to learn the correlation between opcodes
and to obtain the feature vector representation of each opcode.
Then, a two-stage LSTM model is used to learn the opcode
sequence patterns of each sample and to generate the predic-
tive model. Finally, we use the predictive model to perform
malware detection on the testing set in order to evaluate its
performance.
A. Data Processing
In order to obtain the features of opcode sequence, we
need to extract opcode sequence from each assembly format
file. Typically, this type of assembly format file contains four
basic predefined segments, .text segment, .idata segment, .rdata
segment, and .data segment. Since only the .text segment
stores program instructions and the rest of segments are data
segment, we only consider the contents of .text segment
to extract opcode sequence. Meanwhile, we also find some
meaningless opcodes such as ‘dd’, ‘db’, ‘align’ and so on. To
obtain opcodes that are really beneficial for malware detection,
we need to filter out these meaningless opcodes. Actually,
the opcode sequence can reflect program execution logic of
corresponding executable file. The pseudocode of this opcode
extraction algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Extract Opcode Sequence
Input: Each assembly format file
Output: Corresponding opcode sequence
1: pattern ← predefined matching pattern for extracting
opcode
2: filter ← {‘align′, ‘dd′, ‘db′, ...}
3: file ← open (assembly format file)
4: for eachline in file do
5: if eachline starts with ’.text’ then
6: result ← match (pattern, eachline)
7: if result is not null and result not in filter then
8: add result to corresponding opcode sequence
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
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Fig. 1. The overview of malware detection methodology. Data processing stage includes the conversion of executable file to .asm file and the extraction of
opcode sequence. Modeling stage is consists of the word embedding and the generation of malware detection model.
B. Opcode Representations in Vector Space
Common word representations in NLP are one-hot represen-
tation, bag-of-word, or n-grams. However, the largest defect of
these local representations is that any two words are isolated so
that it can’t reflect the semantic correlation between words. We
use word embedding technique to automatically learn feature
vector representation of opcode. As shown in Figure 2(a), the
Skip-gram model tries to predict its context from input opcode
according to the word window size. In constrast, CBOW model
can predict current word by the given context as shown in
Figure 2(b). If the word window size is set to i, then i is the
maximum distance between the current opcode and predicted
opcode.
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Fig. 2. Two word embedding techniques: Skip-gram and CBOW.
As the model can not directly process opcode in the form
of string, opcode is first converted to one-hot representation.
Hence, We make frequency statistics on all opcode sequence
files and filter out low frequency opcodes to build an opcode
vocabulary. In the end, the opcode vocabulary we created
contains 391 different and valuable opcodes. Accordingly, the
one-hot representation of opcode should be a 391-dimensional
vector which contains only one non-zero element like [0,
0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0], and each opcode gets a unique one-hot
representation.
Then we use the Gensim Python library [19] for word
embedding to obtain the feature vector representation of
opcode. After multiple experimental evaluations, we set the
dimension of the feature vector to 100. In this paper, we use the
CBOW model to implement our proposed malware detection
method. In the experimental evaluation, we will discuss the
impact of different word window sizes and different word
embedding techniques (Skip-gram and CBOW) on malware
detection accuracy in detail. Next, we use a two-stage LSTM
model to learn the comprehensive feature representation of
entire opcode sequence.
C. Feature Representation by LSTM
1) Long-short term memory : As a typical and improved
recurrent neural network, long-short term memory (LSTM)
[14] is suitable for processing and predicting time series
problems. LSTM model introduces a new structure called a
memory cell, which is composed of three main elements: an
input gate, a forget gate and an output gate, to control the
transmission of information, as seen Figure 3. Because of
this special structure, LSTM can alleviate the vanishing and
exploding gradient problem.
memory cell 
input
memory cell 
output
input gate output gate
forget gate
self-recurrent 
connection
Fig. 3. Illustration of a standard memory cell.
Let xt denote the input to memory cell at time t; let Wi,
Wf , Wc, Wo, Ui, Uf , Uc, Uo and Vo be weight matrixes; let
bi, bf , bc and bo be bias vectors. Formally, the equations below
describe that how a memory cell is updated at time t.
• First, we calculate the value of the forget gate ft, the
value of the input gate it, and update the previous state
of the memory cell to C˜t.
ft = σ(Wfxt + Ufht−1 + bf ) (1)
it = σ(Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi) (2)
C˜t = tanh(Wcxt + Ucht−1 + bc) (3)
• Second, given the value of the input gate, the value of
the forget gate and the value of updated state C˜t, we can
calculate new state of memory cell, Ct, at time t.
Ct = it ∗ C˜t + ft ∗ Ct−1 (4)
• With the new state of memory cell, we can calculate the
value of the output gate and the output of memory cell.
ot = σ(Woxt + Uoht−1 + VoCt + bo) (5)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(Ct) (6)
In the above formula, σ is the logistic sigmoid function,
so the value of gating vector it, ft, ot are in [0,1]. tanh
is the hyperbolic tangent function and * is the pointwise
multiplication operation.
2) Two-stage LSTM: We conduct detailed statistics on the
frequency of each opcode that appear in the dataset. The
statistical results are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Figure 4
presents the average of opcodes for each type of samples and
top 10 most used opcodes in the dataset. Figure 5 also presents
the most frequent 10 opcode for each type of samples.
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Fig. 4. The average of opcodes for each type of samples and Top 10 opcodes
in the dataset.
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Fig. 5. Most frequent 10 opcodes for each type of samples in the dataset.
Based on statistical results, we observe that that most of
the instructions are executed sequentially when the program
are executed. That is, the jump instructions and function
call instruction occupy only a small proportion. This process
is very similar to natural language processing. Hence, as
shown in Figure 6, we can make an analogy between a
long article and an assembly instruction file. Then we also
make an equivalent analogy between an assembly instruction
function and a complete sentence in the article. Similarly, each
instruction is analogous to the word in the sentence.
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Fig. 6. An equivalent analogy between NLP and malware detection.
The positional relationship between words constitutes a
sentence, and the context between sentences constitutes an ar-
ticle. Similarly, the positional relationship between instructions
constitutes an assembly function, and the mutual call between
functions forms an assembly instruction file. Although the
instructions consist of opcodes and operands, in this paper, we
only use opcodes that represent specific operational behaviors
to replace instructions. In the end, the experimental results also
show that this analogy intuition is indeed feasible.
Therefore, we propose a two-stage LSTM model for mal-
ware detection, which can handle opcode sequence of different
length. Figure 7 shows the structure of the two-stage LSTM.
We use two LSTM layers and one mean-pooling layer to
obtain the feature representation of each opcode sequence
file. In this paper, every opcode is represented as a 100-
dimensional vector. The input of the first LSTM layer is all
word embedding in the opcode sequence, and its output is
corresponding function vector representation. Because LSTM
current timestep input contains both the output of the previous
timestep and the input of the current timestep, so we can
use the output of the last timestep in each function to be as
function vector representation. And all the function vectors are
the input of the second LSTM layer.
Differently, we added a mean-pooling layer after the second
LSTM layer, which can enhance the invariance of feature
representation. Assuming that the second LSTM layer will
produce a representation sequence h1, h2, ..., hAveLen, the
mean-pooling layer will average over all timesteps resulting in
representation haverage. That is, the hidden vectors obtained
at every timestep in the second LSTM layer are averaged to
acquire the feature representation of entire opcode sequence.
Because of the use of this two-stage LSTM model, we can
not only consider the positional relationship between opcodes,
but also combine semantic information between functions
to obtain a comprehensive feature representation of opcode
sequence file. Finally, this representation is fed as the feature
to a softmax layer to output the probability of classifying the
executable file as every class. Softmax function is calculated
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Fig. 7. The model is consists of two LSTM hidden layer, a mean-pooling layer and a softmax layer.
as follows, where N is the number of executable file classes
and Si is the probability of belonging to the i-th class.
Si =
exp(vi)∑N
j=1 exp(vj)
(7)
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS
In this section, we present the experimental results to
demonstrate the malware detection performance of our pro-
posed method. We use python language to implement this
malware detection framework based on Tensorflow [20] and
Keras [21], and all the experiments are conducted on a
computer with 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 CPU, NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1050 GPU and 8GB memory.
A. Data Collection
Raw collections consist of 969 malware samples and 123
benign samples. Part of them are from the malware samples
provided by Microsoft [22]. For each malware sample, two file
formats are provided, the hexadecimal representation of the
file’s binary content and the corresponding assembly (.asm)
format files, but we only use the .asm file generated by IDA
Pro. The others are the executable file we collect, including
benign applications such as browsers and system programs, as
well as various malwares collected from some public malware
websites such as MalwareDB [23] and Virusshare [24]. By
reference to Microsofts classification format and Virustotal’s
analysis result [25], these malwares are divided into the
following categories: Worm, Adware, Backdoor, Trojan and
Downloader. Then, we use the disassembly tool, IDA Pro, to
get the corresponding .asm file to form the entire dataset. The
details on dataset can be seen Table 1. Finally, We randomly
choose 70% samples as training set and choose 30% samples
as testing set.
TABLE I
THE DETAILS ON DATASET
Collections Numbers
Worm 155
Adware 248
Backdoor 442
Trojan 48
Downloader 76
Benign 123
B. Evaluation Metric
For the sake of convenience, we first introduce the confusion
matrix for malware detection, as shown in Table 2.
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX
Predicted class
Malware Benign
Actual Malware TP FNBenign FP TN
In the evaluation section, we use the following met-
rics: true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR)
and accuracy (ACC). TPR is equal to TP/(TP+FN), and
FPR is equal to FP/(FP+TN), and ACC is equal to
(TP+TN)/(TP+FN+FP+TN). An excellent model will have a
higher TPR, a higher ACC, and a lower FPR. Hence, we
also use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve in order
to measure comprehensively both TPR and FPR. ROC curve
typically features TPR on the Y axis, and FPR on the X axis.
That is, the top left corner of the plot is the ideal point - a
FPR of zero and a TPR of one so that a larger area under the
curve (AUC) is usually better.
C. Experimental Results
We conduct lots of experiments to evaluate the dection
performance of our proposed malware analysis method. The
experiment is divided into two parts. On one hand, we collec-
tively refer to Worm, Adware, Backdoor, Trojan, and Down-
loader as malware. In other words, it is a binary classification
problem, either malware or benign file. On the other hand, we
conducted more detailed malware classification experiments,
which is a multi-classification problem. Anyway, we first use
the training set to train this two-stage LSTM model (predictive
model), and then use the trained model to predict the testing
set. For the sake of generality, all of the models mentioned in
this paper are used to predict the testing set after training 100
epochs using the traing set.
1) Preferences: First, we discuss the impact of different
word window sizes and different word embedding techniques
(Skip-gram and CBOW) on malware detection performance.
Table 3 lists the experimental results. In general, the malware
detection performance of using the CBOW model as word
embedding techniqeu is better than the malware detection
performance of using the Skip-gram model as word embedding
technique. It can also be seen that setting word window size to
10 and choosing CBOW model as word embedding technique
is the best option. Hence, we use the CBOW model as word
embedding technique and set the word window size to 10 in
the following experiments.
2) The effect of the second LSTM layer: Figure 8 and
Figure 9 show the impact of the second LSTM layer on mal-
ware detection performance. It can be seen that the malware
detection performance of two-stage LSTM model is always
better than ‘not second LSTM layer’ model for both binary
classification problem and multi-classification problem.
3) The comparison with other approachs: Figure 10 and
Figure 11 show the performance comparison of the two-stage
LSTM model and other related malware detection approachs.
Related approachs include the convolutional neural network
(CNN), RNN and the multilayer perceptron (MLP). It can
be seen that the performance of two-stage LSTM model is
significantly better than RNN for both binary classification
and multi-classification. It can also be seen that the two-stage
LSTM model is better than MLP for both binary classification
and multi-classification, and is slightly better than CNN for
binary classification and multi-classification. Although the per-
formance of CNN and two-stage LSTM model is comparable,
the time cost of training CNN model is much greater than the
time cost of training two-stage LSTM model because CNN
model usually has a very large number of parameters.
Based on the experimental results, we can conclude that
the method we proposed performs excellently on malware
detection and malware classification.
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Fig. 8. Binary classification: the performance comparison of two-stage LSTM
model and ‘not second LSTM layer’ model.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient malware
detection method. Similar to natural language processing, the
word embedding technique and LSTM are used to auto-
matically learn the correlation between opcodes and feature
representation of opcode sequence, respectively. In addition,
to increase invariance of the local feature representation, we
also introduce a mean-pooling layer after second LSTM layer.
To verify the availability of the proposed method, we perform a
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Fig. 10. Binary-classification: the performance comparison of the two-stage
LSTM model and other related malware detection approachs.
TABLE III
DETECTION ACCURACY OF DIFFERENT WORD WINDOW SIZES AND DIFFERENT WORD EMBEDDING TECHNIQUES
Word window size Skip-gram (ACC) CBOW (ACC)Binary-classification Multi-classification Binary-classification Multi-classificatio
5 96.34% 92.07% 96.95% 89.94%
7 96.95% 91.16% 96.95% 91.16%
10 97.26% 92.99% 97.87% 94.51%
15 97.18% 91.77% 97.56% 90.55%
30 95.73% 91.46% 95.73% 92.38%
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Fig. 11. Multi-classification: the performance comparison of the two-stage
LSTM model and other related malware detection approachs.
series of experiments on the dataset that includes 969 malwares
and 123 benign files. Experimental results also demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed method in malware detection and
malware classification.
On the other hand, the instructions consist of opcodes and
operands. However, we only use the opcodes to conduct the
experiment. Although the opcodes can reflect the specific
operational behavior of the program, the operands may also
reveal some different sensitive information between malware
and benign files. Therefore, the use of operands for malware
detection will be our future work.
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